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INTRODUCTION
Much recent scholarship has emphasized institutional differences in corporate
governance, capital markets, and law among European, American, and Japanese
companies.' Despite very real differences in the corporate systems, the deeper
tendency is toward convergence, as it has been since the nineteenth century. The
basic law of corporate governance-indeed, most of corporate law-has achieved
a high degree of uniformity across developed market jurisdictions, and continu-
ing convergence toward a single, standard model is likely. The core legal
features of the corporate form were already well established in advanced
jurisdictions one hundred years ago, at the turn of the twentieth century.
Although there remained considerable room for variation in governance prac-
tices and in the fine structure of corporate law throughout the twentieth century,
the pressures for further convergence are now rapidly growing. Chief among
these pressures is the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered ideology of
corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key commer-
cial jurisdictions. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that
corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.
This emergent consensus has already profoundly affected corporate governance
practices throughout the world. It is only a matter of time before its influence is
felt in the reform of corporate law as well.
I. CONVERGENCE PAST: THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE FORM
We must begin with the recognition that the law of business corporations had
already achieved a remarkable degree of worldwide convergence at the end of
the nineteenth century. By that time, large-scale business enterprise in every
major commercial jurisdiction had come to be organized in the corporate form,
and the core functional features of that form were essentially identical across
these jurisdictions. Those features, which continue to characterize the corporate
form today, are: (1) full legal personality, including well-defined authority to
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bind the firm to contracts and to bond those contracts with assets that are the
property of the firm, as distinct from the firm's owners; 2 (2) limited liability for
owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by investors of capital; (4) del-
egated management under a board structure; and (5) transferable shares.
These core characteristics, both individually and in combination, offer impor-
tant efficiencies in organizing the large firms with multiple owners that have
come to dominate developed market economies. We explore those efficiencies
in detail elsewhere. 3 What is important to note here is that while those character-
istics and their associated efficiencies are now commonly taken for granted,
prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century there existed only a handful of
specially chartered companies that combined all five of these characteristics.
The joint stock company with tradeable shares was not made generally available
for business activities in England until 1844, and limited liability was not added
to the form until 1855.4 While some American states developed the form for
general use a few years earlier, all general business corporation statutes appear
to date from well after 1800. By around 1900, however, every major commer-
cial jurisdiction appears to have provided for at least one standard-form legal
entity- with the five characteristics listed above as the default rules, and this has
remained the case ever since. Thus there was already strong and rapid conver-
gence a century ago regarding the basic elements of the law of business
corporations. It is, in general, only in the more detailed structure of corporate
law that jurisdictions have varied significantly since then.
The five basic characteristics of the corporate form provide, by their nature,
for a firm that is strongly responsive to shareholder interests. They do not,
however, necessarily dictate how the interests of other participants in the
firm-such as employees, creditors, other suppliers, customers, or society at
large-will be accommodated. Nor do they dictate the way in which conflicts of
interest among shareholders themselves-and particularly between controlling
and noncontrolling shareholders-will be resolved. Throughout most of the
twentieth century there has been debate over these issues and experimentation
with alternative approaches to them.
II. THE SHAREHOLDER-ORIENTED (OR "STANDARD") MODEL
Recent years, however, have brought strong evidence of a growing consensus
on these issues among the academic, business, and governmental elites in
leading jurisdictions. The principal elements of this emerging consensus are that
ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the
2. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, YALE L.J.
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managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage
the corporation in the interests of its shareholders; other corporate constituen-
cies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers, should have their
interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through
participation in corporate governance; noncontrolling shareholders should re-
ceive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling sharehold-
ers; and the market value of the publicly traded corporation's shares is the
principal measure of its shareholders' interests. For simplicity, we shall refer to
the view of the corporation comprised by these elements as the "standard
shareholder-oriented model" of the corporate form (or, for brevity, simply "the
standard model"). To the extent that corporate law bears on the implementation
of this standard model-as to an important degree it does-this consensus on
the appropriate conduct of corporate affairs is also a consensus as to the
appropriate content of corporate law, and it is likely to have profound effects on
the structure of that law.
A. IN WHOSE INTEREST?
As we argue in Part IV, there is today a broad normative consensus that
shareholders alone are the parties to whom corporate managers should be
accountable, resulting from widespread disenchantment with a privileged role
for managers, employees, or the state in corporate affairs. This is not to say that
there is agreement that corporations should be run in the interests of sharehold-
ers alone-much less that the law should sanction that result. All thoughtful
people believe that corporate enterprise should be organized and operated to
serve the interests of society as a whole, and that the interests of shareholders
deserve no greater weight in this social calculus than do the interests of any
other members of society. The point is simply that now, as a consequence of
both logic and experience, there is convergence on a consensus that the best
means to this end (that is, the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make
corporate managers strongly accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in
direct terms, only to those interests. It follows that even the extreme proponents
of the so-called "concession theory" of the corporation can embrace the primacy
of shareholder interests in good conscience.5
5. In a hoary debate that cuts across jurisdictional boundaries, proponents of the view that corpora-
tions exist by virtue of a state "concession" or privilege have also been associated with the view that
corporations ought to be governed in the interests of society--or all corporate constituencies-rather
than in the private interest of shareholders alone. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145, 1148-50 (1932); PAUL G. MAHONEY, CONTRACT
OR CONCESSION? A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON BuslNESS CORPORATIONS (University of Virginia School of
Law, Working Paper, 1999) (on file with author). Conversely, proponents of the view that the
corporation is at bottom a contract among investors have tended to advance the primacy of shareholder
interests in corporate governance.
In our view the traditional debate between concession and contract theorists is simply confused. On
the one hand, corporations-whether "concessions" or contracts-should be regulated when it is in the
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Of course, asserting the primacy of shareholder interests in corporate law
does not imply that the interests of corporate stakeholders must or should go
unprotected. It merely indicates that the most efficacious legal mechanisms for
protecting the interests of nonshareholder constituencies-or at least all constitu-
encies other than creditors-lie outside of corporate law. For workers, this
includes the law of labor contracting, pension law, health and safety law, and
antidiscrimination law. For consumers, it includes product safety regulation,
warranty law, tort law governing product liability, antitrust law, and mandatory
disclosure of product contents and characteristics. For the public at large, it
includes environmental law and the law of nuisance and mass torts.
Creditors, to be sure, are to some degree an exception. There remains general
agreement that corporate law should directly regulate some aspects of the
relationship between a business corporation and its creditors. Conspicuous
examples include rules governing veil-piercing and limits on the distribution of
dividends in the presence of inadequate capital. The reason for these rules,
however, is that there are unique problems of creditor contracting that are
integral to the corporate form, owing principally to the presence of limited
liability as a structural characteristic of that form. These types of rules, however,
are modest in scope. Outside of bankruptcy, they do not involve creditors in
corporate governance, but rather are confined to limiting shareholders' ability to
use the characteristics of the corporate form opportunistically to exploit credi-
tors.
B. WHICH SHAREHOLDERS?
The shareholder-oriented model does more than assert the primacy of share-
holder interests, however. It asserts the interests of all shareholders, including
minority shareholders. More particularly, it is a central tenet in the standard
model that minority or noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protec-
tion from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders. In publicly
traded firms, this means that all shareholders should be assured an essentially
equal claim on corporate earnings and assets.
There are two conspicuous reasons for this approach, both of which are
rooted in efficiency concerns. One reason is that, absent credible protection for
noncontrolling shareholders, business corporations will have difficulty raising
capital from the equity markets. The second reason is that the devices by which
controlling shareholders divert to themselves a disproportionate share of corpo-
rate benefits commonly involve inefficient investment choices and management
policies.
public interest to do so. On the other hand, the standard model is, in effect, an assertion that social
welfare is best served by encouraging corporate managers to pursue shareholder interests.
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C. THE IMPORT OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
It is sometimes said that the shareholder-oriented model of corporate law is
well suited only to those jurisdictions in which one finds large numbers of firms
with widely dispersed share ownership, such as the United States and the United
Kingdom. A different model is appropriate, it is said, for those jurisdictions in
which ownership is more concentrated, such as the nations of continental
Europe. This view, however, is unconvincing.
Closely held corporations, like publicly held corporations, operate most
efficiently when the law helps assure that managers are primarily responsive to
shareholder interests and that controlling shareholders do not opportunistically
exploit noncontrolling shareholders. The shareholder primacy model does not
logically privilege any particular ownership structure. Indeed, both concentrated
and dispersed shareholdings have been celebrated, at different times and by
different commentators, for their ability to advance shareholder interests in the
face of serious agency problems.
Equally important, every jurisdiction includes a range of corporate ownership
structures. While both the U.S. and U.K. have many large firms with dispersed
ownership, both countries also contain a far larger number of corporations that
are closely held. Similarly, every major continental European jurisdiction has at
least a handful of firms with dispersed ownership, and the number of such firms
is evidently growing. It follows that every jurisdiction must have a system of
corporate law that is adequate to handle the full range of ownership structures.
Thus, just as there was rapid crystallization of the core features of the
corporate form in the late nineteenth century, at the beginning of the twenty-first
century we are witnessing rapid convergence on the standard shareholder-
oriented model as a normatiye view of corporate structure and governance. We
should also expect this normative convergence to produce substantial conver-
gence in the practices of corporate governance and in corporate law.
III. FORCES OF IDEOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
There are three principal factors driving consensus on the standard model: the
failure of alternative models; the competitive pressures of global commerce;
and the shift of interest group influence in favor of an emerging shareholder
class. We consider these developments here in sequence.
A. THE FAILURE OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS
Debate and experimentation concerning the basic structure of corporate law
during the twentieth century centered on the ways in which that law should
accommodate the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. In this regard,
three principal alternatives to a shareholder-oriented model were the traditional
foci of attention. We term these the manager-oriented, labor-oriented, and
state-oriented models of corporate law. Although each of these three alternative
models has, at various points and in various jurisdictions, achieved some
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success both in practice and in received opinion, all three have ultimately lost
much of their normative appeal.
1. The Manager-Oriented Model
In the United States, there existed an important strain of normative thought
from the 1930s through the 1960s that extolled the virtues of granting substan-
tial discretion to the managers of large business corporations. Merrick Dodd and
John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, were conspicuously identified with this
position, and Adolph Berle came to it late in life.6 At the core of this view was
the belief that professional corporate managers could serve as disinterested
technocratic fiduciaries who would guide business corporations to perform in
ways that would serve the general public interest. The corporate social responsi-
bility literature of the 1950s can be seen as an embodiment of these views.7
The normative appeal of this view arguably provided part of the rationale for
the various legal developments in U.S. law in the 1950s and 1960s that tended
to reinforce the discretionary authority of corporate managers, such as the SEC
proxy rules and the Williams Act. The collapse of the conglomerate movement
in the 1970s and 1980s, however, largely destroyed the normative appeal of the
managerialist model. It is now the conventional wisdom that, when managers
are given great discretion over corporate investment policies, they tend to serve
disproportionately their own interests, however well-intentioned managers may
be. While managerial firms may be in some ways more efficiently responsive to
nonshareholder interests than are firms that are more dedicated to serving their
shareholders, the price paid in inefficiency of operations and excessive invest-
ment in low-value projects is now considered too great.
2. The Labor-Oriented Model
Large-scale enterprise clearly presents problems of labor contracting. Simple
contracts and the basic doctrines of contract law are inadequate in themselves to
govern the long-term relationships between workers and the firms that employ
them-relationships that may be afflicted by, among other things, substantial
transaction-specific investments and asymmetries of information.
6. Dodd and Berle conducted a classic debate on the subject in the 1930s, in which Dodd pressed the
social responsibility of corporate managers while Berle championed shareholder interests. See Adolph
A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1049 (1931); Adolph A. Berle,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1365, 1367-68 (1932); Dodd,
supra note 5, at 1145. By the 1950s, Berle seemed to have come around to Dodd's celebration of
managerial discretion as a positive virtue that permits managers to act in the interests of society as a
whole. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN
POLmCAL ECONOMY 107-10 (1959) [hereinafter BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY]. John Kenneth
Galbraith takes a similar position in The New Industrial State. See JoHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
7. See, e.g., BERLE, POWER WITHOUT PROPERTY, supra note 6; GAuLRArrH, supra note 6. For an
important collection of essays arguing both sides of the question of managerial responsibility to the
broader interests of society, see THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SociEfrY (Edward Mason ed., 1959).
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Collective bargaining via organized unions has been one approach to those
problems-an approach that lies outside corporate law, since it is not dependent
on the organizational structure of the firms with which the employees bargain.
Another approach, and one that importantly involves corporate law, has been to
involve employees directly in corporate governance by, for example, providing
for employee representation on the firm's board of directors. Although serious
attention was given to employee participation in corporate governance in Ger-
many as early as the Weimar Republic, unionism was the dominant approach
everywhere until the Second World War. Then, after the War, serious experimen-
tation with employee participation in corporate governance began in Europe.
The results of this experimentation are most conspicuous in Germany, where,
under legislation initially adopted for the coal and steel industries in 1951 and
extended by stages to the rest of German industry between 1952 and 1976,
employees are entitled to elect half of the members of the (upper-tier) board of
directors in all large German firms. This German form of "codetermination" has
been the most far-reaching experiment with employee participation. It is not
unique, however. A number of other European countries have experimented in
more modest ways, typically requiring between one and three labor representa-
tives on the boards of large corporations. Moreover, the Dutch have adopted a
wholly unique model for larger domestic companies that combines elements of
the manager-, labor-, and state-oriented models. Under the Dutch "structure"
regime, supervisory boards are self-appointing, although both labor and share-
holders retain the right to object to the board appointments. In the event of an
objection, the commercial court decides.
Enthusiasm for employee participation crested in the 1970s with the radical
expansion of codetermination in Germany and the drafting of the European
Community's proposed Fifth Directive on Company Law,8 under which German-
style codetermination would be extended throughout Europe. Employee partici-
pation also attracted considerable attention in the United States during that
period, as adversarial unionism began to lose its appeal as a means of dealing
with problems of labor contracting and, in fact, began to disappear from the
industrial scene. Since then, worker participation in corporate governance has
steadily lost power as a normative ideal. Despite repeated dilution, Europe's
Fifth Directive has never become law, and it now seems highly unlikely that
German-style codetermination will ever be adopted elsewhere.
The growing view today is that meaningful direct worker voting participation
in corporate affairs tends to produce inefficient decisions, paralysis, or weak
boards, and that these costs are likely to exceed any potential benefits that
worker participation might bring. The problem, at root, seems to be one of
governance. While direct employee participation in corporate decisionmaking
8. Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty Concerning
the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, 1983 O.J.
(C 240) 2.
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may mitigate some of the inefficiencies that can beset labor contracting, the
workforce in typical firms is too heterogeneous in its interests to form an
effective governing body-and the problems are magnified greatly when employ-
ees must share governance with investors, as in codetermined firms. In general,
contractual devices, whatever their weaknesses, are (when supplemented by
appropriate labor market regulation) evidently superior to voting and other
collective choice mechanisms in resolving conflicts of interest among and
between a corporation's investors and employees. 9
Today, even inside Germany, few commentators argue for codetermination as
a general model for corporate law in other jurisdictions. Rather, codetermination
now tends to be defended in Germany as, at most, a workable adaptation to
local interests and circumstances or, even more modestly, an experiment that,
though of questionable value, would now be politically difficult to undo.lO
3. The State-Oriented Model
Both before and after the Second World War, there was widespread support
for a corporatist system in which the government would play a strong direct role
in the affairs of.large business firms to provide some assurance that private
enterprise would serve the public interest. Technocratic government bureau-
crats, the theory went, would help to avoid the deficiencies of the market
through the direct exercise of influence in corporate affairs. This approach was
most extensively realized in postwar France and Japan. In the United States,
though there was little actual experimentation with this approach outside of the
defense industries, the model attracted considerable intellectual attention. Per-
haps the most influential exposition of the state-oriented model in the Anglo-
American world was Andrew Shonfield's 1968 book, Modem Capitalism, with
its admiring description of French and Japanese style "indicative planning."'1
The strong performance of the Japanese economy, and subsequently of other
state-guided Asian economies, lent substantial credibility to this model even
through the 1980s.
The principal instruments of state control over corporate affairs in corporatist
economies generally lie outside of corporate law. They include, for example,
9. See HANSMANN, supra note 3, at 89-119; Henry Hansmann, Probleme von Kollektiventscheidungen
und Theorie der Firma-Folgerungen fir die Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung, in OKONOMIscHE ANALYSE
DES UNTERNEHMENSRECHTS 287-305 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schdfer eds., 1993); Henry Hansmann,
Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589, 589-606 (1993). On the
weaknesses of German boards, see, for example, Mark Roe, German Securities Markets and German
Codetermination, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 167.
10. Some commentators, of course, continue to see codetermination as a core element of a unique
Northern European form of corporate governance. See, e.g., MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM
(1993) (asserting generally the superiority of the "Rhine Model" of capitalism over the "Anglo-Saxon
Model"). Even Albert concedes, however, the growing ideological power of shareholder-oriented
corporate governance. See id. at 169-90.
11. ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER
84-85 (1968).
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substantial discretion in the hands of government bureaucrats over the alloca-
tion of credit, foreign exchange, licenses, and exemptions from anticompetition
rules. Nevertheless, corporate law also plays a role by, for example, weakening
shareholder control over corporate managers (to reduce pressures on managers
that might operate counter to the preferences of the state) and employing
state-administered criminal sanctions rather than shareholder-controlled civil
lawsuits as the principal sanction for managerial malfeasance (to give the state
strong authority over managers that could be exercised at the government's
discretion).
The state-oriented model, however, has now also lost most of its attraction.
One reason is the move away from state socialism in general as a popular
intellectual and political model. Important landmarks on this path include the
rise of Thatcherism in England in the 1970s, Mitterand's abandonment of state
ownership in France in the 1980s, and the sudden collapse of communism
nearly everywhere in the 1990s. The relatively poor performance of the Japa-
nese corporate sector after 1989, together with the more recent collapse of other
Asian economies that were organized on state corporatist lines, has now discred-
ited this model even further. Today, few would assert that giving the state a
strong direct hand in corporate affairs has much normative appeal.
4. Stakeholder Models
Over the past decade, the literature on corporate governance and corporate
law has sometimes advocated "stakeholder" models as a normatively attractive
alternative to a strongly shareholder-oriented view of the corporation. The
stakeholders involved may be employees, creditors, customers, merchants in a
firm's local community, or even broader interest groups such as beneficiaries of
a well-preserved environment. The stakeholders, it is argued, will be subject to
opportunistic exploitation by the firm and its shareholders if corporate managers
are accountable only to the firm's shareholders; corporate law must therefore
ensure that managers are responsive to stakeholder interests as well.
While stakeholder models start with a common problem, they posit two
different kinds of solutions. One group of stakeholder models looks to what we
term a "fiduciary" model of the corporation, in which the board of directors
functions as a neutral coordinator of the contributions and returns of all stakehold-
ers in the firm. Under this model, only investors are given direct representation
on the corporate board. Other stakeholders are protected by relaxing the board's
duty or incentive to represent only the interests of shareholders, thus giving the
board greater discretion to look after other stakeholders' interests.
The fiduciary model finds its most explicit recognition in U.S. law in the
form of constituency statutes that permit boards to consider the interests of
constituencies other than shareholders in mounting takeover defenses. Margaret
Blair and Lynn Stout, sophisticated American advocates of the fiduciary model,
also claim to find support for this normative model in other, broader aspects of
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U.S. corporate law. 12 In the U.K., the fiduciary model is a key element in the
ongoing debate over the duties of corporate directors. '
3
The second group of stakeholder models substitutes direct stakeholder repre-
sentatives for fiduciary directors. In this "representative" model of the corpora-
tion, two or more stakeholder constituencies appoint representatives to the
board of directors, which then elaborates policies that maximize the joint
welfare of all stakeholders, subject to the bargaining leverage that each group
brings to the boardroom table. The board functions ideally then as a kind of
collective fiduciary, even though its individual members remain partisan repre-
sentatives. The board of directors (or supervisory board) then becomes an
unmediated "coalition of stakeholder groups" and functions as "an arena for
cooperation with respect to the function of monitoring the management," as
well as an arena for resolving "conflicts with respect to the specific interests of
different stakeholder groups."
14
Neither the fiduciary nor the representative stakeholder models, however,
constitute at bottom a new approach to the corporation. Rather, despite the new
rhetoric with which the stakeholder models are presented, and the more explicit
economic theorizing that sometimes accompanies them, they are at heart just
variants on the older manager-oriented and labor-oriented models. Stakeholder
models of the fiduciary type are in effect just reformulations of the manager-
oriented model, and they suffer the same weaknesses. While untethered manag-
ers may better serve the interests of some classes of stakeholders, such as a
firm's existing employees and creditors, the managers' own interests will often
come to have disproportionate prominence in their decisionmaking, with costs
to some interest groups-such as shareholders, customers, and potential new
employees and creditors-that outweigh any gains to the stakeholders who
benefit. Moreover, the courts are evidently incapable of formulating and enforc-
ing fiduciary duties of sufficient refinement to ensure that managers behave
more efficiently and fairly.
Stakeholder models of the representative type closely resemble yesterday's
labor-oriented model, though generalized to extend to other stakeholders as
well, and are again subject to the same weaknesses. The mandatory inclusion of
12. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 287-319 (1999).
13. See COMPANY LAW REFORM STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ENVIRON-
MENT: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 39-46 (1999) (setting forth the alternatives of maintaining the existing
directorial duty of following enlightened shareholder interest or reformulating a "pluralist" duty to all
major stakeholders in order to encourage firm-specific investment). After comment and discussion,
however, the U.K. Company Law Reform Steering Group has chosen to propose the shareholder
primacy norm, in accordance with the emerging consensus of legal scholars and practitioners every-
where. See COMPANY LAW REFORM STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK 29-31 (2000) (directors must act for the benefit of "members as
a whole," that is, shareholders).
14. REINHARD H. SMiTH & GERALD SPINDLER, PATH DEPENDENCE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPLE-
MENTARITY-A COMMENT ON BEBCHUK AND ROE 14, (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universitat Working
Paper Series: Finance and Accounting No. 27, 1999).
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any set of stakeholder representatives on the board is likely to impair corporate
decisionmaking processes with costly consequences that outweigh any gains to
the groups that obtain representation. Thus, the same forces that have been
discrediting the older models are also undermining the stakeholder model as a
viable alternative to the shareholder-oriented model.
B. COMPETITIVE PRESSURES TOWARD CONVERGENCE
The shareholder-oriented model has emerged as the normative consensus not
just because of the failure of the alternatives, but because important economic
forces have made the virtues of that model increasingly salient. There are,
broadly speaking, three ways in which a model of corporate governance can
come to be recognized as superior: by force of logic, by force of example, and
by force of competition. The emerging consensus in favor of the standard model
has, in recent years, been driven with increasing intensity by each of these
forces. We examine them here in turn.
1. The Force of Logic
An important source of the success of the standard model is that, in recent
years, scholars and other commentators in law, economics, and business have
developed persuasive reasons, which we have already explored above, to be-
lieve that this model offers greater efficiencies than the principal alternatives.
One of these reasons is that, in most circumstances, the interests of equity
investors in the firm-the firm's residual claimants---cannot adequately be
protected by contract. Rather, to protect their interests, they must be given the
right to control the firm. A second reason is that, if the control rights granted to
the firm's equity-holders are exclusive and strong, they will have powerful
incentives to maximize the value of the firm. A third reason is that the interests
of participants in the firm other than shareholders can generally be given
substantial protection by contract and regulation, so that maximization of the
firm's value by its shareholders complements the interests of those other
participants rather than competing with them. A fourth reason is that, even
where contractual and regulatory devices offer only imperfect protection for
nonshareholder interests, adapting the firm's governance structure to make it
directly responsible to those interests creates more difficulties than it solves.
This reasoning is today reflected in much of the current literature on corpo-
rate finance and the economics of the firm-a literature that is becoming
increasingly international. The consequence is to highlight the economic case
for the shareholder-oriented model of governance. In addition, the persuasive
power of the standard model has been amplified through its acceptance by a
worldwide network of corporate intermediaries, including international law
firms, the big five accounting firms, and the principal investment banks and
consulting firms-a network whose rapidly expanding scale and scope give it
exceptional influence in diffusing the standard model of shareholder-centered
corporate governance.
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2. The Force of Example
The second source of the success of the standard model of corporate gover-
nance is the economic performance of jurisdictions in which it predominates. A
simple comparison across countries adhering to different models-at least in
very recent years-lends credence to the view that adherence to the standard
model promotes better economic outcomes. The developed common-law jurisdic-
tions have performed well in comparison to the principal East Asian and
continental European countries, which are less in alignment with the standard
model. The main examples include, of course, the strong performance of the
American economy in comparison with the weaker economic performance of
the German, Japanese, and French economies.
One might surely object that the success of the shareholder-oriented model is
quite recent and will perhaps prove to be ephemeral, and that the apparent
normative consensus based on that success will be ephemeral as well. After all,
only fifteen years ago many thought that Japanese and German firms, which
were clearly not organized on the shareholder-oriented model, were winning the
competition, and that this was because they had adopted a superior form of
corporate governance.' 5 However, this is probably a mistaken interpretation of
the nature of the economic competition in recent decades, and it is surely at
odds with today's prevailing opinion. The competition of the 1960s, '70s, and
early '80s was in fact among Japanese state-oriented corporations, German
labor-oriented corporations, and American manager-oriented corporations. It
was not until the late 1980s that one could speak of widespread international
competition from shareholder-oriented firms.
3. The Force of Competition
The increasing internationalization of both product and financial markets has
brought individual firms from jurisdictions adhering to different models into
direct competition. It is now widely thought that firms organized and operated
according to the shareholder-oriented model have had the upper hand in these
more direct encounters as well. 16 Such firms can be expected to have important
competitive advantages over firms adhering more closely to other models.
These advantages include access to equity capital at lower cost (including,
15. To be fair, however, American commentators tended to praise corporate governance in Germany
and Japan in the name of the shareholder model. Thus, it was the purported ability of German banks to
monitor managers and correctly value long-term business projects that caught the eye of American
commentators after the 1970s, not codetermination or the labor-oriented model of the firm. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA 69-71
(1991).
16. Indirect evidence to this effect comes from international surveys such as a recent poll of top
managers conducted by The Financial Times to determine the world's most respected companies. Four
of the top five most respected companies were American and hence operated under the shareholder
model (the fifth was DaimlerChrysler, which is "almost" American for these purposes). Similarly,
twenty-nine of the top forty firms were either American or British. See Annual Review, World's Most
Respected Companies, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 7, 1999.
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conspicuously, start-up capital), more aggressive development of new product
markets,' 7 stronger incentives to reorganize along lines that are managerially
coherent, and more rapid abandonment of inefficient investments.
These competitive advantages do not always imply that firms governed by the
standard model will displace those governed by an alternative model in the
course of firm-to-firm competition, for two reasons. First, firms operating under
the standard model may be no more efficient than other firms in many respects.
For example, state-oriented Japanese and Korean companies have demonstrated
great efficiency in the management and expansion of standardized production
processes, while German and Dutch firms such as Daimler Benz and Philips
(operating under labor- and management-oriented models, respectively) have
been widely recognized for engineering prowess and technical innovation.
Second, even when firms governed by the standard model are clearly more
efficient than their nonstandard competitors, the cost-conscious standard-model
firms may be forced to abandon particular markets for precisely that reason.
Less efficient firms organized under alternative models may overinvest in
capacity or accept abnormally low returns on their investments in general, and
thereby come to dominate a product market by underpricing their profit-
maximizing competitors. But if the competitive advantages of standard-model
firms do not necessarily force the displacement of nonstandard firms in estab-
lished markets, these standard-model firms are likely, for the reasons offered
above, to achieve a disproportionate share among start-up firms, in new product
markets, and in industries that are in the process of rapid change.' 8
The ability of standard-model firms to expand rapidly in growth industries is
magnified, moreover, by access to institutional investors and the international
equity markets, which understandably prefer shareholder-oriented governance
and are influential advocates of the standard model. Those equity investors,
after all, are exclusively interested in maximizing the financial returns on their
investments. Over time, then, the standard model is likely to win the competi-
tive struggle on the margins, confining other governance models to older firms
and mature product markets. As the pace of technological change continues to
quicken, this competitive advantage should continue to increase.
C. THE RISE OF THE SHAREHOLDER CLASS
In tandem with the competitive forces just described, a final source of
ideological convergence on the standard model is a fundamental realignment of
17. See, e.g., ROMAN FRYDMAN Er AL., WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS? ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE
RESTRUCTURING OF ENTrERPRISES IN CENTRAL EUROPE (1998) (asserting that firms privatized to outside
owners proved superior to state firms and firms privatized to workers or previous managers in new
market development).
18. In this regard it should be noted that small- and medium-sized firms in every jurisdiction are
organized under legal regimes consistent with the standard model. Thus, shareholders-and sharehold-
ers alone-select the members of supervisory boards in the vast majority of (smaller) German and
Dutch firms. These jurisdictions impose alternative labor- or manager-oriented regimes only on a
minority of comparatively large firms.
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interest group structures in developed economies. At the center of this realign-
ment is the emergence of a public shareholder class as a broad and powerful
interest group in both corporate and political affairs across jurisdictions. There
are two elements to this realignment. The first is the rapid expansion of the
ownership of equity securities within broad segments of society, creating a
coherent interest group that presents an increasingly strong countervailing force
to the organized interests of managers, employees, and the state. The second is
the shift in power, within this expanding shareholder class, in favor of the
interests of minority and noncontrolling shareholders over those of inside or
controlling shareholders.
1. The Diffusion of Equity Ownership
Stock ownership is becoming more pervasive everywhere.' 9 No longer is it
confined to a small group of wealthy citizens. In the United States, this diffusion
of share ownership has been underway since the beginning of the twentieth
century. In recent years, however, it has accelerated substantially. Since the
Second World War, an ever-increasing number of American workers have had
their savings invested in corporate equities through pension funds. Over the
same period, the mutual fund industry has also expanded rapidly, becoming the
repository of an ever-increasing share of nonpension savings for the population
at large.2° We have begun to see parallel developments in Europe and Japan,
and to some extent elsewhere, as markets for equity securities have become
more developed. 2'
The growing wealth of developed societies is a major factor underlying these
changes. Even blue-collar workers now often have sufficient personal savings to
justify investment in equity securities. No longer do labor and capital constitute
clearly distinct interest groups in society. Workers, through share ownership,
increasingly share the economic interests of other equity-holders. Indeed, in the
United States, union pension funds are today quite active in pressing the view
that companies must be managed in the best interests of their shareholders.22
19. Stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP has risen dramatically in virtually every
major jurisdiction over the past 20 years. In most European countries, the increase has been by a factor
of three or four. See Schools Brief: Stocks in Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1999, at 85-86.
20. See generally THE GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH CENTER, THE CONFERENCE BOARD,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: PATTERNS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT AND CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES (1997).
21. Latin America offers a telling example. In 1981, Chile became the first country in the region to
set up a system of private pension funds. By 1995, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru had done the same.
By 1996, a total of $108 billion was under management in Latin American pension funds, which by
then had come to play an important role in the development of the local equity markets. In 1997, it was
estimated that total assets would grow to $200 billion by 2000 and to $600 billion by 2011. See A
Private Affair, LATIN FIN., Dec. 1998, at 61; Stephen Fidler, Chile's Crusader for the Cause, FIN. TIMES
(LONDON), Mar. 14, 1997, at 3; Save Amigo Save, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9, 1995, at 15.
22. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Activism by Labor Unions, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/
SUPPLEMENrs TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 341 (S. Estreicher ed., 1998).
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2. The Shift in Balance Toward Public Shareholders
As the example of the activist union pension funds suggests, diffusion of
share ownership is only one aspect of the rise of the shareholder class. Another
aspect is the new prominence of substantial institutions that have interests
coincident with those of public shareholders and that are prepared to articulate
and defend those interests. Institutional investors, such as pension funds and
mutual funds-which are particularly prominent in the U.S. and are now rapidly
growing elsewhere as well-are the most conspicuous examples of these institu-
tions. Associations of minority investors in European countries provide another
example. These institutions not only give effective voice to shareholder inter-
ests, but promote in particular the interests of dispersed public shareholders
rather than those of controlling shareholders or corporate insiders. The result is
that ownership of equity among the public at large, while broader than ever, is
at the same time gaining more effective voice in corporate affairs.
Morever, the new activist shareholder-oriented institutions are today acting
increasingly on an international scale. As a consequence, their influence now
reaches well beyond their home jurisdictions.23 We now have not only a
common ideology supporting shareholder-oriented corporate law, but also an
organized interest group to press that ideology-an interest group that is broad,
diverse, and increasingly international in its membership.
In the U.S., the principal effect of the expansion and empowerment of the
shareholder class has been to shift interest group power from managers to
shareholders. In Europe and Japan, the more important effect has been to shift
power away from workers and the state and, increasingly, away from dominant
shareholders.24
D. WEAK FORCES FOR CONVERGENCE
We have spoken here of a number of forces pressing toward international
convergence on a relatively uniform standard model of corporate law. Those
forces include the internal logic of efficiency, competition, interest group pres-
sure, imitation, and the need for compatibility. We have largely ignored two
other potential forces that might also press toward convergence: explicit efforts
at cross-border harmonization, and competition among jurisdictions for corpo-
rate charters.
23. See, e.g., Greg Steinmetz & Michael R. Sesit, Rising U.S. Investment in European Equities
Galvanizes Old World, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999, at Al, A8 (describing U.S. investors as sparking
important governance changes in large European companies).
24. Of particular interest are signs of change in the cross-ownership networks among major German
and Japanese firms. New legislation proposed by the German government would eliminate the heavy
(up to fifty percent) capital gains taxes on corporate sales of stock, which is expected to result in
widespread dissolution of block holdings. See Haig Simonian, Germany to End Tax on Sale of
Cross-Holdings, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 24, 1999, at 1. In Japan, keiretsu structures are beginning to
unwind as a result of bank mergers and competitive pressure to seek higher returns on capital. See Paul
Abrahams & Gillian Tett, The Circle Is Broken, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 9, 1999, at 18.
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1. Harmonization
The European Union has been the locus of the most intense efforts to date at
self-conscious harmonization of corporate law across jurisdictions. That process,
however, has proved a relatively weak force for convergence: Where there exists
substantial divergence in corporate law across member states, efforts at harmonization
have generally borne little fruit. Moreover, harmonization proposals often have been
characterized by an effort to impose throughout the E.U. regulatory measures of
questionable efficiency, with the result that harmonization sometimes seems more an
effort to avoid the standard model than to further it.
For these reasons, the other pressures toward convergence described above
are likely to be much more important forces for convergence than are explicit
efforts at harmonization. At most, we expect that, once the consensus for
adoption of the standard model has become sufficiently strong, harmonization
may serve as a convenient pretext for overriding the objections of entrenched
national interest groups that resist reform of corporate law within individual
states.
2. Competition for Charters
The American experience of competition among state jurisdictions suggests
that cross-border competition for corporate charters can be a powerful force for
convergence in corporate law and, in particular, for convergence on an efficient
model. 25 It seems quite plausible, however, that the choice of law rules neces-
sary for this form of competition will not be adopted in most jurisdictions until
substantial convergence has already taken place. We expect that the most
important steps toward convergence can and will be taken with relative rapidity
before explicit cross-border competition for charters is permitted in most of the
world, and that the latter process will ultimately be used, at most, as a means of
working out the fine details of convergence and of ongoing minor experimenta-
tion and adjustment thereafter.
IV. CONVERGENCE OF GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
Thus far we have attempted to explain the sources of ideological convergence
on the standard model of corporate governance. Our principal argument is on
this normative level; we make the claim that no important competitors to the
standard model of corporate governance remain persuasive today. This claim is
consistent with significant differences among jurisdictions in corporate practice
and law over the short run; ideological convergence does not necessarily mean
rapid convergence in practice. There are many potential obstacles to rapid
institutional convergence, even when there is general consensus on what consti-
tutes best practice. Nevertheless, we believe that the developing ideological
25. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIus OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
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consensus on the standard model will have important implications for the
convergence of practice and law over the long run.
We expect that the reform of corporate governance practices will generally
precede the reform of corporate law, for the simple reason that governance
practice is largely a matter of private ordering that does not require legislative
action. Recent events in most developed jurisdictions-and in many developing
ones-bear out this prediction. Under the influence of the ideological and
interest group changes discussed above, corporate governance reform has al-
ready become the watchword not only in North America but also in Europe and
Japan. Corporate actors are themselves implementing structural changes to
bring their firms closer to the standard model. In the U.S., these changes include
appointment of larger numbers of independent directors to boards of directors,
reduction in overall board size, development of powerful board committees
dominated by outsiders (such as audit committees, compensation committees,
and nominating committees), closer links between management compensation
and the value of the firm's equity securities, and strong communication between
board members and institutional shareholders. In Europe and Japan, many of the
same changes are taking place, though with a lag. Examples range from the
OECD's promulgation of new principles of corporate governance, to recent
decisions by Japanese companies to reduce board sizes and include nonexecu-
tive directors (following the lead of Sony), to the rapid diffusion of stock option
compensation plans for top managers in the U.K. and in the principal commer-
cial jurisdictions of continental Europe.
V. LEGAL CONVERGENCE
Not surprisingly, convergence in the fine structure of corporate law proceeds
more slowly than convergence in governance practices. Legal change requires
legislative action. Nevertheless, we expect shareholder pressure (and the power
of shareholder-oriented ideology) to force gradual legal changes, largely but not
entirely in the direction of Anglo-American corporate and securities law. There
are already important indications of evolutionary convergence in the realms of
board structure, securities regulation, and accounting methodologies, and even
in the regulation of takeovers.
A. BOARD STRUCTURE
With respect to board structure, convergence has been in the direction of a
legal regime that strongly favors a single-tier board that is relatively small and
that contains some insiders as well as a majority of outside directors. Mandatory
two-tier board structures seem a thing of the past; the weaker and less respon-
sive boards that they promote are justified principally as a complement to
worker codetermination and thus share-indeed, constitute one of-the weak-
nesses of the latter institution. The declining fortunes of the two-tier board are
reflected in the evolution of the European Union's Proposed Regulation on the
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Statute for a European Company. When originally drafted in 1970, that Regula-
tion called for a mandatory two-tier board. In 1991, however, the Proposed
Regulation was amended to permit member states to prescribe either a two-tier
or a single-tier system. Meanwhile, on the practical side, France, which made
provision for an optional two-tier board when the concept was more in vogue,
has seen few of its corporations adopt the device.2 6
At the same time, jurisdictions that traditionally favored the opposite extreme
of insider-dominated, single-tier boards have come to accept a significant
complement of outside directors. In the U.S., the New York Stock Exchange
listing rules have long mandated that independent directors serve on the impor-
tant audit committees of listed firms 27 and, more recently, state law doctrine has
created a strong role for outside directors in approving transactions where
interests might be conflicted.28 In Japan, a similar evolution may be foreshad-
owed by the recent movement among Japanese companies, mentioned above,
toward smaller boards and independent directors, and by the recent publication
of a code of corporate governance principles advocating these reforms by a
committee of leading Japanese managers.29 The result is convergence from both
ends toward the middle: while two-tier boards themselves seem to be on the
way out, countries with single-tier board structures are incorporating, in their
regimes, one of the strengths of the typical two-tier board regime, namely the
substantial role it gives to independent (outside) directors.
B. DISCLOSURE AND CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION
Regulation of routine disclosure to shareholders, intended to aid in policing
corporate managers, is also converging conspicuously. Without seeking to
examine this complex field in detail here, we note that major jurisdictions
outside of the United States are reinforcing their disclosure systems, while the
U.S. has been retreating from some of the more inexplicably burdensome of its
federal regulations, such as the highly restrictive proxy solicitation rules that
until recently crippled communication among American institutional investors.
Indeed, the subject matter of mandatory disclosure for public companies is
startlingly similar across the major commercial jurisdictions today.
30
26. See Lauren J. Aste, Reforming French Corporate Governance: A Return to the Two Tier Board?,
32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 1, 45 (1999).
27. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303.00, available at
http://www.nyse.com/listedlisted.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
28. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
29. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM OF JAPAN, CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE PRINCIPLES 48-50 (1998).
30. This can be seen, for example, by comparing the E.U.'s Listing Particulars Directive with the
SEC's Form S-1 for the registration of securities under the 1933 Act. If U.S. disclosure requirements
remain more aggressive, one must remember that the E.U. Directives establish minimal requirements
that member states can and do supplement. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The
Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv.
641, 668-72 (1999). See generally Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation:
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Similarly, uniform accounting standards are rapidly crystallizing out of the
babble of national rules and practices into two well-defined sets of international
standards: the GAAP accounting rules administered by the Financial Auditing
Standards Board in the U.S. and the International Accounting Standards adminis-
tered by the International Accounting Standards Committee in London. While
important differences remain between the competing sets of international stan-
dards, these differences are far smaller than the variations among the national
accounting methodologies that preceded GAAP and the new International Stan-
dards. The two international standards, moreover, are likely to converge further,
if only because of the economic savings that would result from a single set of
global accounting standards.3'
C. SHAREHOLDER SUITS
Suits initiated by shareholders against directors and managers are now being
accommodated in countries that had previously rendered them ineffective.
Germany recently reduced the ownership threshold that qualifies shareholders to
demand legal action (to be brought by the supervisory board or special company
representative) against managing directors, dropping that threshold from a ten
percent equity stake to the lesser of a five percent stake or a one million
deutsche Mark stake when there is suspicion of dishonesty or illegality.32 Japan,
in turn, has altered its rules on posting a bond to remove disincentives for
litigation. At the same time, U.S. law is moving toward the center from the
other direction by beginning to rein in the country's strong incentives for
potentially opportunistic litigation. At the federal level, there are recently
strengthened pleading requirements upon initiation of shareholder actions, new
safe harbors for forward-looking company projections, and recent provision for
lead shareholders to take control in class actions. State law rules, meanwhile,
are making it easier for a corporation to get a shareholders' suit dismissed.
D. TAKEOVERS
Regulation of takeovers also seems headed for convergence. As it is, current
differences in takeover regulation are more apparent than real. Hostile takeovers
are rare outside the Anglo-American jurisdictions, principally owing to the more
concentrated patterns of shareholdings outside those jurisdictions. As sharehold-
Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence, 20 CARDozo L. REV. 227 (1998) (discussing convergence in
disclosure rules, accounting standards, and corporate governance). In addition, a recent survey of the
practices of European issuers finds that actual disclosure practices track U.S. and U.K. disclosure
standards even more closely than legal disclosure requirements do. See HOWELL JACKSON & ERIC PAN,
REGULATORY COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE IN 1999 34-39
(John M. Olin Center for Law, Econ. & Bus. Working Paper, Sept. 18, 2000).
31. See, e.g., Elizabeth MacDonald, U.S. Accounting Board Faults Global Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 1999, atAl.
32. See THEODOR BAUMS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY: SYSTEM AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
pt. VII.1 (Universitat Osnabruck Working Paper, 1999).
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ing patterns become more homogeneous (as we expect they will), and as
corporate culture everywhere becomes more accommodating of takeovers (as it
seems destined to), takeovers presumably will become much more common in
Europe, Japan, and elsewhere.33
Moreover, where operative legal constraints on takeovers in fact differ, they
show signs of convergence. In particular, for several decades the U.S. has been
increasing its regulation of takeovers, placing additional constraints both on the
ability of acquirers to act opportunistically and on the ability of incumbent
managers to entrench themselves or engage in self-dealing. With the widespread
diffusion of the "poison pill" defense, and the accompanying limits that courts
have placed on the use of that defense, partial hostile tender offers of a coercive
character are a thing of the past-a result similar to that which European
jurisdictions have accomplished with a "mandatory bid rule," requiring acquir-
ers of control to purchase all shares in their target companies at a single price.
To be sure, jurisdictions diverge in other aspects of takeover law where the
points of convergence are still uncertain. For example, American directors enjoy
far more latitude to defend against hostile takeovers than do directors in most
European jurisdictions. Under current Delaware law, incumbent boards have
authority to resist hostile offers, although they remain vulnerable to bids that are
tied to proxy fights at shareholder meetings. As the incidence of hostile take-
overs increases in Europe, European jurisdictions may incline toward Delaware
by permitting additional defensive tactics. Alternatively, given the dangers of
managerial entrenchment, Delaware may move toward European norms by
limiting defensive tactics more severely. While we cannot predict where the
equilibrium point will lie, it is a reasonable conjecture that the law on both sides
of the Atlantic will ultimately converge on a single regime.
E. JUDICIAL DISCRETION
There remains one very general aspect of corporate law on which one might
feel that convergence will be slow to come: the degree of judicial discretion in
ex post resolution of disputes among corporate actors. Such discretion has long
been much more conspicuous in the common-law jurisdictions, and particularly
in the U.S., than in the civil-law jurisdictions. Even here, though, there is good
reason to believe that there will be strong convergence across systems over
time. Civil-law jurisdictions, whether in the form of court decisionmaking or
33. Already Europe has seen a remarkable wave of takeovers in 1999, culminating in the largest
hostile takeover in history: Vodaphone's acquisition of Mannesmann. In addition, many established
jurisdictions are adopting rules to regulate tender offers that bear a family resemblance to the Williams
Act or to the rules of the London City Code. See, for example, Brazil's tender offer regulations, Secs.
Comm'n Ruling 69, Sept. 8. 1987, Arts. 1-4, and Italy's recently adopted reform of takeover regulation,
Legislative Decree 58 of February 24, 1998 (the Financial Markets Act or so-called "Draghi Reform"),
cited in STuio LEGALE ABBATESCIANN: AssociAzioNE PROFESSIONALE DI AVVOCAn E DoTrou COMMERCIAL-
isn, The New Italian Law on Takeovers, at http://www.sla.it/takeovers.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2000).
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arbitration, seem to be moving toward a more discretionary model.3 4 United
States securities law is civilian in spirit and elaborated by detailed rules
promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). At the same time,
there are signs of growing discomfort with the more extreme forms of unpredict-
able ex post decisionmaking that have sometimes been characteristic of, say, the
Delaware courts. Scholars have begun to suspect the open-ended texture of
Delware case law, 35 while the American Law Institute has offered a code-like
systemization of corporate law in the form of the Corporate Governance
Project, which includes even the notoriously vague and open-ended U.S. case
law that articulates the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.
VI. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO CONVERGENCE
To be sure, important interests are threatened by movement toward the
standard model, and those interests can be expected to serve as a brake on
change. We doubt, however, that such interests will be able to stave off for long
the reforms called for by the growing ideological consensus focused on the
standard model.
To take one example, consider the argument, prominently made by Lucian
Bebchuk and Mark Roe, 3 6 that the private value extracted by corporate control-
lers (controlling shareholders or powerful managers) will long serve as a barrier
to the evolution of efficient ownership structures, governance practices, and
corporate law. The essential structure of the Bebchuk and Roe argument is as
follows: In jurisdictions lacking strong protection for minority shareholders,
controlling shareholders divert to themselves a disproportionate share of corpo-
rate cash flows. The controlling shareholders thus have an incentive to avoid
any change in their firm's ownership or governance, or in the regulation to
which their firm is subject, that would force them to share the corporation's
earnings more equitably. Moreover, these corporate insiders have the power in
many jurisdictions to prevent such changes. Their position as controlling share-
holders permits them to block changes in the firm's ownership structure merely
by refusing to sell their shares. Their position also permits them to block
changes in governance by selecting the firm's directors. And, in those societies
in which-as in most of Europe-closely controlled firms dominate the economy,
the wealth and collective political weight of controlling shareholders permits
34. See The Holzmuller decision of the German Federal Court, BGHZ, Zivilsenat, II ZR 174/80
(1982) (German case law extension of shareholder right to vote to all fundamental corporate transac-
tions).
35. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, The Chancellor's Foot in Delaware: Schnell and Its Progeny, 14
J. CoRP. L. 515 (1989); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminancy in Corporate
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-
Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
36. See Lucian Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999).
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them to block legal reforms that would compromise their disproportionate
private returns.
This pessimistic view seems unwarranted, though. If, as the developing
consensus view holds, the standard shareholder-oriented governance model
maximizes corporate value, controlling shareholders who are motivated chiefly
by economic considerations may not wish to retain control of their firms. And,
even if nonmonetary considerations lead insiders to retain control, the economic
significance of firms dominated by these insiders is likely to diminish over time
both in their own jurisdictions and in the world market.
A. TRANSACTIONS TO CAPTURE SURPLUS
First, consider the case of controlling shareholders ("controllers") who wish
to maximize their financial returns. Suppose that the prevailing legal regime
permits controlling shareholders to extract large private benefits from which
public shareholders are excluded. Predictably, these controllers will sell their
shares only if they receive a premium price that captures the value of their
private benefits, and they will reject any corporate governance reform that
reduces the value of those returns. That such controllers will prefer to increase
their own returns over increasing returns to the corporation does not imply,
however, that they will reject governance institutions or ownership structures
that maximize firm value. Bebchuk and Roe are too quick to conclude that
controllers cannot themselves profit by facilitating efficient governance.
Controllers who extract large private benefits from public companies are
likely to indulge in two forms of inefficient management. First, they may select
investment projects that maximize their own private returns over returns to the
firm. For example, a controller might select a less profitable investment project
over a more profitable one precisely because it offers opportunities for lucrative
self-dealing. Second, controllers are likely to have a preference for retaining and
reinvesting earnings over distributing them, even when it is inefficient to do so.
The reason is that formal corporate distributions must be shared with minority
shareholders, while earnings reinvested in the firm remain available for subse-
quent conversion into private benefits-for example, through self-dealing trans-
actions. Moreover, a controller's incentive to engage in both forms of inefficient
behavior increases markedly if-as has been common in Europe-she employs
devices such as stock pyramids, corporate cross-holdings, and dual-class stock
to maintain a lock on voting control while reducing her proportionate equity
stake.37
Where law enforcement is effective, however, inefficient behavior itself
creates strong financial incentives to pursue more efficient ownership and
governance structures. When share prices are sufficiently depressed, anyone-
37. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK ET AL., STOCK PYRAMIDS, CROSS-OWNERSHIP, AND DuAL CLASS EQUITY: THE
CREATION AND AGENCY COSTS OF SEPARATING CONTROL FROM CASH FLOW RIGHTS (NBER Working Paper
No. 6951, 1999).
[Vol. 89:439
THE END OF HISTORY FOR CORPORATE LAW
including controllers themselves---can generate net gains by introducing more
efficient governance structures. It follows that controllers who can capture most
or all of the value of these efficiency gains stand to profit privately even more
than they profit by extracting non-pro-rata benefits from poorly governed firms.
Controllers can capture these efficiency gains, moreover, in at least two ways:
(1) by selling out at a premium price reflecting potential efficiency gains to a
buyer or group of buyers that is willing and able to operate under nonexploit-
ative governance rules; or (2) by buying up minority shares (at depressed
prices) and either managing their firms as sole owners or reselling their entire
firms to buyers with efficient ownership structures.
For controllers to extract these efficiency gains, however, efficient restructur-
ing must be legally possible: That is, the legal regime must offer means by
which restructured firms can commit to good governance practices. This can be
done in several ways without threatening the private returns of controllers who
have not yet undertaken to restructure. One solution is an optional corporate and
securities law regime that is more dedicated to protecting minority shareholders
than the prevailing regime. For example, firms can be permitted to list their
shares on foreign exchanges with more rigorous shareholder-protection rules.
Another solution is simply to enforce shareholder-protective provisions that are
written into a restructured firm's articles of incorporation.
It follows that even financially self-interested controllers have an incentive to
promote the creation of legal regimes in which firms at least have a choice of
forming along efficient lines, which, as we have argued, today means along
shareholder-oriented lines. Once such an (optional) efficient regime has been
established and many of the existing exploitative firms have taken advantage of
the regime to profit from an efficient restructuring, there should be a serious
reduction in the size of the interest group that wishes even to maintain as an
option the old regime's accommodation of firms that are exploitative toward
noncontrolling shareholders.
Bebchuk and Roe appear to assume that such developments will not occur
because the law will inhibit controlling shareholders from seeking efficient
restructuring by forcing them to share any gains from the restructuring equitably
with noncontrolling shareholders. It is more plausible, however, to suppose that
the law will allow controlling shareholders to claim the gains associated with an
efficient restructuring-by means of techniques such as freezeout mergers and
coercive tender offers-in jurisdictions where controllers are able to extract
large private benefits from ordinary corporate operations. In short, if current
controlling shareholders are interested just in maximizing their financial returns,
we can expect substantial pressure toward the adoption of efficient law.
B. CONTROLLERS WHO WISH TO BUILD EMPIRES
Controlling shareholders do not always, however, wish to maximize their
financial returns. Rather-and we suspect this is often true in Europe-they
may also seek nonpecuniary returns. For example, a controlling shareholder
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may wish simply to be on top of the largest corporate empire possible, and
therefore be prepared to overinvest in building market share by selling at a price
too low to maximize returns while reinvesting all available returns in expanded
capacity and research and development. Alternatively, a controller may be
willing to accept a low financial return in order to indulge a taste for a wide
range of other costly practices, from putting incompetent family members in
positions of responsibility to preserving quasi-feudal relations with employees
and their local communities. Such practices may even be efficient if the
controller values his nonpecuniary returns more than he would the monetary
returns that are given up. Where the controller shares ownership with noncontrol-
ling shareholders who do not value the nonpecuniary returns, though, there is
the risk that the controlling shareholder will exploit the noncontrolling sharehold-
ers by refusing to distribute the firm's earnings and instead reinvesting those
earnings in low-return projects that are valued principally by the controller.38
Efficiency-enhancing control transactions of the type described in the preced-
ing section may have little to offer controlling shareholders of this type, since
the restructuring may require that they give up control of the firm, and hence
give up not only the nonpecuniary returns they were purchasing for themselves
with the noncontrolling shareholders' money, but also the nonpecuniary returns
they were purchasing with their own share of the firm's invested capital. Thus,
controlling shareholders who value nonpecuniary gains will have less incentive
than controllers whose motives are purely financial to favor efficient corporate
legal structures.
Moreover, inefficient firms with such controllers may survive quite nicely in
competitive markets and, in fact, expand, despite their inefficiencies. For ex-
ample, if the controllers place value only on the size of the firm they control,
they will continue to reinvest in expansion so long as the return offered simply
exceeds zero, with the result that they can and will take market share from
competing firms that are managed much more efficiently but must pay their
shareholders a market rate of return.
Jurisdictions with large numbers of firms dominated by controllers with
nonpecuniary motivations will, therefore, feel relatively less pressure than other
jurisdictions to adopt standard-model corporate law. Yet even in those jurisdic-
tions-which may include much of Western Europe today-the pressure for
moving toward the standard model is likely to grow irresistibly strong in the
relatively near future. We briefly explore here several reasons for this.
38. This can, of course, happen only where the controllers somehow have been able to mislead the
noncontrolling shareholders. If the latter shareholders purchased their shares knowing that they would
not have control, and that the controllers would divert a share of returns to themselves through
inefficient investments, then they presumably paid a price for the shares that was discounted to reflect
this diversion, leaving the noncontrolling shareholders with a market rate of return on their investment.
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1. The Insiders' Political Clout Will Be Insufficient to Protect Them
To begin with, the low profitability of firms that pursue nonpecuniary returns
is likely to select against their owners as controllers of industry. As long as the
owners of these firms subsidize low-productivity practices, they become progres-
sively poorer relative to investors in new businesses and owners of established
firms who seek either to enhance shareholder value or to sell out to others who
will, with the result that economic and political influence will shift to the latter.
Furthermore, the success of firms following shareholder-oriented governance
practices is likely to undermine political support for alternative models of
corporate governance for two reasons. First, as we have suggested above, the
rise of a shareholder class with growing wealth creates an interest group to press
for reform of corporate governance to encourage value-enhancing practices and
restrain controlling shareholders from extracting private benefits. Companies,
whether domestic or foreign, that attract public shareholders and pension funds
by promising a better bottom line also create natural enthusiasts for law reform
and the standard model.
The second reason for a decline in the appeal of alternative styles of
corporate governance is the broader phenomenon of ideological convergence on
the standard model. Where previous ideologies may have celebrated the no-
blesse oblige of quasi-feudal family firms or the industrial prowess of huge
conglomerates ruled by insiders, the increasing salience of the standard model
makes empire-building and domination suspect, and the extraction of private
value at the expense of minority shareholders illegitimate. Costly governance
practices therefore become increasingly hard to sustain politically. Viewed
through the lens of the new ideology, the old practices are not only inefficient
but also unjust, since they deprive ordinary citizens, including pensioners and
small investors, of a fair return on their investments. As civil society grows
more democratic, the privileged returns of controlling shareholders, leading
families, and entrenched managers become increasingly suspect.
Indeed, we expect that the social values that make it so prestigious for
families to control corporate empires in many countries will change importantly
in the years to come. The essentially feudal norms we now see in many patterns
of industrial ownership will be displaced by social values that place greater
weight on social egalitarianism and individual entrepreneurship, with the result
that there will be an ever-dwindling group of firms dominated by controllers
who place great weight on the nonpecuniary returns from presiding personally
over a corporate fiefdom.
2. The Insiders Who Preserve Their Firms and Legal Protections Will Become
Increasingly Irrelevant
Finally, even if dominant corporate controllers successfully block reform for
some period of time in any given jurisdiction, they are likely to become
increasingly irrelevant in the domestic economy, the world economy, or both. At
home, as we have already noted, the terms on which public equity capital
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becomes available to finance new firms and new product markets are likely to
be dominated by the standard model. Venture capital investments and initial
public offerings are unlikely to occur if minority investors are not offered
significant protection. This protection can be provided without disturbing the
older, established firms by establishing separate standard-model institutions that
apply only to new firms. An example of this is the Neuer Markt in the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange, which provides the additional protection of enhanced disclo-
sure and GAAP accounting standards for investors in start-up companies in
search of equity capital, while leaving the less rigorous older rules in place for
already established firms.
Moreover, to the extent that domestic law or domestic firms fail to provide
adequate protections for public shareholders, other jurisdictions can supply the
protection of the standard model. Investment capital can flow to other countries
and to foreign firms that do business in the home jurisdiction. Alternatively,
domestic companies may be able to reincorporate in foreign jurisdictions or
bind themselves to comply with the shareholder protections offered by foreign
law by listing on a foreign exchange (as some Israeli firms now do by listing on
NASDAQ).39
Through devices such as these that effectively permit new firms to adopt a
model that differs from that applicable to old firms, the national law and
governance practices that protect controlling insiders in established firms can be
maintained without crippling the national economy. The result is to partition off,
and grandfather in, the older family-controlled or manager-dominated firms,
whose costly governance practices will make them increasingly irrelevant to
economic activity even within their local jurisdictions.
VII. EFFmCiNT NON-CONVERGENCE
Not all divergence among corporate law regimes reflects inefficiency. Effi-
cient divergence can arise either through adaptation to local social structures or
through fortuity. Neither logic nor competition is likely to create strong pressure
for this form of divergence to disappear. Consequently, it could survive for a
considerable period of time. Still, though the rate of change may be slower,
there is good reason to believe that even the extent of efficient divergence, like
the extent of inefficient divergence, will continue to decrease relatively quickly.
A. DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
Sometimes jurisdictions choose alternative forms of corporate law because
those alternatives complement other national differences in, for example, forms
of shareholdings, means for enforcing the law, or related bodies of law such as
bankruptcy. A case in point is the new Russian corporation statute, which
39. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 30, at 674-76; EDWARD ROCK, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AS CREDIBLE
COMMITMENT: GOING PUBLIC, OPTING IN, OPTING OUT, AND GLOBALATION (University of Pennsylvania
Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper, 1998).
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deviates self-consciously from the type of statute that the standard model would
call for in more developed economies. To take just one example, the Russian
statute imposes cumulative voting on all corporations as a mandatory rule, in
strong contrast to the corporate law of most developed countries. The reason for
this approach was largely to ensure some degree of shareholder influence and
access to information in the context of the peculiar pattern of shareholdings that
has become commonplace in Russia as a result of that country's unique process
of mass privatization.4 °
Nevertheless, the efficient degree of divergence in corporate law appears
much smaller than the divergence in the other institutions in which corporate
activity is 'embedded. For example, efficient divergence in creditor protection
devices is probably much narrower than observed differences in the sources and
structure of corporate credit. Similarly, the efficient array of mechanisms for
protecting shareholders from managerial opportunism appears much narrower
than the observed variety across jurisdictions in patterns of shareholdings.
Moreover, the economic institutions and legal structures in which corporate
law must operate are themselves becoming more uniform across jurisdictions.
This is conspicuously true, for example, of patterns of shareholdings. All
countries are beginning to face, or need to face, the same varied types of
shareholders, from controlling blockholders to mutual funds to highly dispersed
individual shareholders. Some of this is driven by the converging forces of
internal economic development. Thus, privatization of enterprise, increases in
personal wealth, and the need for start-up finance (which is aided by a public
market that offers an exit for the initial private investors) all promote an
increasing incidence of small shareholdings and a consequent need for strong
protection for minority shareholders. The globalization of capital markets presses
to the same end. Hence Russia, to return to our earlier example, will presumably
evolve over time toward the patterns of shareholdings typical of developed
economies, and it will ultimately feel the need to conform its shareholder voting
rules more closely to the rules found in those economies.
B. HARMLESS MUTATIONS
In various cases we anticipate that there will be little or no efficiency
difference among multiple alternative corporate law rules. In these cases, the
pressures for convergence are lessened, although not entirely eliminated (since
we still expect global investors to exert pressure to standardize). 41 Accounting
40. Following Russian voucher privatization in 1993, managers and other employees typically held a
majority of shares in large companies. Publicly held shares were mostly widely dispersed, but there was
often at least one substantial outside shareholder with sufficient holdings to exploit a cumulative voting
rule to obtain board representation. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1911, 1922-23 (1996).
41. Ronald Gilson refers to processes in which facially different governance structures or legal rules
develop to solve the same underlying functional problem as "functional convergence." RONALD J.
GILSON, GLOBALIZINO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CONVERGENCE OF FoRM OR FUNCTION (Columbia Law
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standards offer an example. As we noted earlier, there are currently two
different accounting methodologies that have achieved prominence among devel-
oped nations: the American GAAP and the European-inspired International
Accounting Standards. Because these two sets of standards evolved separately,
they differ in many significant details. From the best current evidence, however,
neither obviously dominates the other in terms of efficiency.
If the economies involved were entirely autarchic, both accounting standards
might well survive indefinitely with no sacrifice in efficiency. The increasing
globalization of the capital markets, however, imposes strong pressure on all
countries not only to adopt one or the other of these regimes but also to select a
single common accounting regime. Over time, then, the network efficiencies of
a common standard form in global markets are likely to eliminate even this and
other forms of fortuitous divergence in corporate law.
VIII. INEFFICIENT CONVERGENCE
Having just recognized that efficiency does not always dictate convergence in
corporate law, we must also recognize that the reverse can be true as well: A
high degree of convergence need not always reflect efficiency. The most likely
sources of such inefficient convergence are flaws in markets or in political
institutions that are widely shared by modem economies and that are reinforced
rather than mitigated by cross-border competition.
A. THIRD-PARTY COSTS: CORPORATE TORTS
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of inefficient convergence is the
rule-already universal, with only minor variations from one jurisdiction to the
next-that limits shareholder liability for corporate torts. This rule induces
inefficient risk-taking and excessive levels of risky activities-inefficiencies
that appear to outweigh by far any offsetting benefits, such as reduced costs of
litigation or the smoother functioning of the securities markets. As we have
argued elsewhere, a general rule of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for
corporate torts appears to offer far greater overall efficiencies.42
Why, then, has there been universal convergence on an inefficient rule? The
obvious answer is that neither markets nor politics works well to represent the
School, Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 174, 2000). On the assumption that formal
law and governance practices are embedded in larger institutional contexts that change only slowly,
Gilson conjectures that functional convergence is likely to outpace formal convergence. Such functional
convergence, when it occurs, is what we term harmless mutation. In contrast to Gilson, however, we
believe that formal law and governance structures are less contextual and more malleable than is often
assumed, once the norm of shareholder primacy is accepted. Functional convergence-rather than
straightforward imitation-is thus less necessary than Gilson supposes. We also suspect that close
substitutes among alternative governance structures and legal rules are less widespread than Gilson
implies.
42. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corpo-
rate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1882-83 (1991).
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interests of the persons who bear the direct costs of the rule, namely tort
victims. Since, by definition, torts involve injuries to third parties, the parties
affected by the rule-corporations and their potential tort victims-cannot
contract around the rule to capture and share the gains from its alteration. At the
same time, owing to the highly stochastic nature of most corporate torts, tort
victims-and particularly the very large class of potential tort victims-do not
constitute an easily organized political interest group.4 3 Moreover, even if a
given jurisdiction were to adopt a rule of shareholder liability for corporate
torts, difficulties in enforcement would arise from the ease with which sharehold-
ings or incorporation can today be shifted to other jurisdictions that retain the
rule of limited liability.
B. MANAGERIALISM
A second example of inefficient convergence, arguably, is the considerable
freedom enjoyed by managers in almost all jurisdictions to protect their preroga-
tives in cases when they might conflict with those of shareholders, particularly
including managers' ability to defend their positions against hostile takeover
attempts. Again, political and market failures seem responsible. Dispersed
public shareholders, who are the persons most likely to be disadvantaged by the
power of entrenched managers, face potentially serious problems of collective
action in making their voice felt. Managers, whose positions make them a
powerful and influential interest group everywhere, can use their political
influence to keep the costs of collective action high-for example, by making it
hard for a hostile acquirer to purchase an effective control block of shares from
current shareholders. Corporate law might therefore converge, not precisely to
the shareholder-oriented standard model that represents the ideological consen-
sus, but rather to a variant of that model that has a slight managerialist tilt.
C. HOW BIG A PROBLEM?
The problem of inefficient convergence in corporate law appears to be a
relatively limited one, however. Tort victims aside, the relations among virtually
all actors directly affected by the corporation are heavily contractual, which
tends to give those actors a common interest in establishing efficient law.
Moreover, as our earlier discussion has emphasized, shareholders, managers,
workers, and voluntary creditors either have acquired or are acquiring a power-
ful interest in efficient corporate law. Indeed, limited liability in tort arguably
should not be considered a rule of corporate law at all, but instead should be
viewed as a rule of tort law. And even limited liability in tort may come to be
abandoned as large-scale tort damage becomes more common and, conse-
quently, of greater political concern. We already see some movement in this
43. By way of contrast, the largely nonstochastic tort of environmental pollution has made an easier
focus for political organizing in the United States and, as noted in the text below, has led to strong
legislation that partially pierces the corporate veil for firms that pollute.
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direction in U.S. environmental law, which pushes aside the corporate veil to a
startling degree in particular circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its
principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as
twenty-five years ago. Logic alone did not establish the superiority of this
standard model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies, which establish a
strong corporate management with duties to serve the interests of shareholders
alone, as well as strong minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard
model earned its position as the dominant model of the large corporation the
hard way, by out-competing during the post-World War II period the three
alternative models of corporate governance: the managerialist model, the labor-
oriented model, and the state-oriented model.
If the failure of the principal alternatives has established the ideological
hegemony of the standard model, though, perhaps this should not come as a
complete surprise. The standard model has never been questioned for the vast
majority of corporations. It dominates the law and governance of closely held
corporations in every jurisdiction. Most German companies do not participate in
the codetermination regime, and most Dutch companies are not regulated by the
managerialist "structure" regime. Similarly, the standard model of shareholder
primacy has always been the dominant legal model in the two jurisdictions
where the choice of models might be expected to matter most: the U.S. and the
U.K. The choice of models matters in these jurisdictions because large compa-
nies often have highly fragmented ownership structures. In continental Europe,
where most large companies are controlled by large shareholders, 44 the interests
of controlling shareholders traditionally dominate corporate policy no matter
what the prevailing ideology of the corporate form.
We predict, therefore, that as equity markets evolve in Europe and throughout
the developed world, the ideological and competitive attractions of the standard
model will become indisputable, even among legal academics. And as the goal
of shareholder primacy becomes second nature even to politicians, convergence
in most aspects of the law and practice of corporate governance is sure to
follow.
44. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FnI. 471, 505 (1999)
(stating that large firms tend to have controlling shareholders in all but common-law jurisdictions).
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